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IRASCIBLE COMMENTS ON THE
REVENUE LAWS
GEoRGE F. J~mms*
EPTEMBER 20 the President of the United States signed the Rev-
enue Act of 1941, an act of which one damning thing may and
should be said. It is an act drawn in the tradition of the last
twenty years and giving no evidence of a genuine attack upon the basic
fiscal problems of the nation. We have had a federal income tax since
1913 and a federal estate tax since x96. In the early 192o's both of these
crystallized into the form which they hold today. The basic estate tax
act is still the act of 1926. The income tax law has been changed at al-
most every session of Congress since its original enactment but remains
much the same. For almost twenty years the changes have been of a
purely tinkering type. Rates for a time were lowered; since the depres-
sion they have been raised steadily and, to some, alarmingly. Exemptions
have been reduced. Minor reforms and trivial changes have been all too
frequent as treasury officials and congressional advisers attempted by
strictly ad hoc legislation to meet with minimum ingenuity the tax avoid-
ance devices evolved by private counsel.
Occasionally somewhat larger changes have been attempted, such as the
short-lived undistributed profits tax against corporations., Even these re-
forms, however, have been designed with far too great particularity.
Where more sweeping alterations might have been largely successful,
these small-scale efforts have sometimes failed entirely and been with-
drawn, as was the undistributed profits tax, and sometimes succeeded in
stopping one leak only to have other leaks spring up around the patch.
Now, in 1941, with a record-breaking national debt, a business struc-
ture subject to extraordinary and often incalculable stresses, and the heavi
est fiscal demands in the history of the nation, Congress has been content
again to apply its old panacea: exemptions have been lowered, rates
raised, and new nuisance taxes enacted. Is it not time that the entire
structure be reexamined to consider what major changes could be effected
more equitably to distribute and effectively to raise the tremendous and
growing levies which this present demands?
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
'Revenue Act of 1936, at § 14, 49 Stat. 1655 (1936). The tax was notreenactedin the Rev-
enue Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 447 (1938).
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As we have noted, the 1941 act was perhaps unusual in that it effected
no reforms whatsoever in the tax structure. However, attempts were made
in the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means Committees to attack
-one of the more obvious shortcomings of the present law. In a considera-
tion of possibly desirable changes, this may be a good place to start.
The Senate proposal was extremely modest, limited, and obvious. Un-
der the bill reported by the Finance Committee, for the purpose of de-
termining the income tax of any individual, income earned by each spouse
(whether or not treated as community property under the state law)
should be considered as the income of the earner, and income from prop-
erty of a marital community should be considered the income of the
spouse having its management and control under the state law.2 This pro-
vision was aimed to accomplish one purpose: to equalize the tax burden
of similarly situated couples living in and out of certain western states
having community property laws. For this purpose the rule dealing with
earned income was the important one. The significant advantage enjoyed
by residents of the community property states lies in this-that whereas
earned income in the non-community states cannot be assigned in advance
so as to equalize the surtax brackets of husband and wife3 under commu-
nity property law all earned income is automatically credited half to each
spouse. Since this rule is accepted as controlling under the federal in-
come tax,4 the minimum bracketing is automatically obtained, where
there is no other income.
Once income from investment becomes a significant or controlling fac-
tor, the tax advantage of community property tends to disappear. Unlike
earned income, investment income can everywhere be assigned.' It may
or may not even be necessary to assign the corpus of the investment, and
in any case assignment of income and corpus together will be effective to
shift the tax burden of the income.6 Thus the investor in any state, having
the option of returning his income jointly with his wife or severally, can
adjust his affairs to result in the minimum tax on the income of the two,
paying at most a moderate fee under the gift tax to obtain substantial
income tax savings. The Senate draft would have equalized the present
2 H.R. 5417, 7 7th Cong. ist Sess. § 119 (1941), as reported out by the Senate Finance
Committee.
3 Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. I i (1930).
4 Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
s Blair v. Con'r, 3oo U.S. 5 (1937).
6Compare Bing v. Bowers, 22 F. (2d) 45o (D. C. N. Y. 1927), Lowery v. Helvering, 7o F-
(2d) 713 (C.C.A. 2d 1934), and Blair v. Com'r, 3oo U.S. 5 (1937).
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inequality of tax on earned incomes between community and non-commu-
nity property states-an inequality which Professor Griswold of Harvard
recently characterized as one of the three great defects of the income tax
laws.7 The hint of a filibuster by one of the gentlemen from Texas was
enough to kill this obvious though relatively trivial improvement.
The House plan was sounder, broader in scope and aimed at a more
important objective. Under Section iii (b) as reported out by the Ways
and Means Committee, all married couples would have been required to
file joint returns, lumping the income, credits and deductions of both to
compute a single net taxable income. At the election of either spouse,
liability for the tax would have been several, the tax being allocated be-
tween the two in proportion to their respective net incomes. One effect
of such a provision would be to neutralize the advantages of community
property and income. If husband and wife are required to compute and
report their income jointly, it can make no difference how state law might
distribute it between them. But the House bill would have done more
than this, and more than the suggestion of the Senate Finance Commit-
tee. As pointed out above, in any common law state income from invest-
ments can be distributed between husband and wife so as to fall within
minimum surtax brackets by a legally effective assignment of the invest-
ments from which the income is derived. For example, a married man
having an earned income of $12,ooo a year and an income of another
$io,ooo a year from investments of a fair market value of $200,000, could
reduce his income tax for 1941 by almost $2,ooo by transferring his in-
vestments to his wife, or to a trust for his wife's benefit. True, it would
cost him about $15,000 in gift tax to do it, but reducing the family capital
by $i5,ooo would cut income only $750 a year, against a tax gain of $2,00o
a year. Nor would the capital loss be permanent. If the wife survive the
husband, or if secondary beneficiaries be named under a trust in the event
of the wife's predecease, the gift tax will be more than offset by avoidance
of estate tax on the death of the husband. The example here outlined is a
moderate one. Where really large incomes from investment are involved,
the possible tax savings which can result by splitting income between
husband and wife on separate returns are astonishing. Moreover, the elec-
tion to file joint or separate returns is not even binding from year to year.
If either spouse happens in some year to have deductions more than equal
to his income, a joint return can be utilized to reduce the taxable income
of the other spouse.
7 N.Y. Times, § 4, p. 8, col. 5 (Jan. 12, 1941).
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Of course, a married couple whose income comes entirely or almost en-
tirely from the earnings of the husband cannot thus distribute and reduce
the tax, because of the non-recognition for income tax purposes of assign-
ments of future earnings.8 At the same income level the present state of
the law thus operates to discriminate in favor of income from investments
and against earned incomes. This is the discrimination which the House
committee's proposal was designed to eliminate.
The proposal was met by a most extraordinary array of arguments
centering around the somewhat mystical notion that the combination of
husband's and wife's incomes, even for the purpose of computing a tax
(the proposed act providing not for joint but for several obligation to
pay) was inconsistent with the spirit of married women's property acts.
It was further argued that the tax would constitute a deterrent to marriage
and a bonus for immorality. The latter argument seems more appropriate
for the pages of Punch where it first appeared, advanced by the British
humorist, A. P. Herbert, than it does for any serious discussion of legisla-
tive policy.9 But the opposition to the mandatory joint return was vigor-
ous, its support from the administration somewhat pallid, and it was dis-
carded upon the floor of the House of Representatives.
This ends the simple catalog of even attempted improvements in the
revenue laws in the year 1941. The suggestion of the Senate Committee
would have done something; the suggestion of the House Committee a
little more. Both were apparently too revolutionary for the temper of
Congress. But not even the preferable proposal advanced in the House
would have more than scratched the surface of the more obvious inequali-
ties in the personal income tax. For example, we have already pointed
out that the present possibility of separate returns by husband and wife
affords a great advantage to persons whose income is derived principally
from investment. The technique which leads to tax savings by the divi-
sion of a single family income into two parts with a consequent reduction
in surtax rates is capable, where the size of the fortune justifies the exer-
cise of ingenuity, of much more far-reaching application. Assume the case
of a husband and wife with minor children and with a regular income
greatly in excess of current requirements. Not only may this income be
split between the parents; through the device of family trusts it is capable
of almost indefinite division.' 0 Sections 16x, 162, and 163 of the Internal
8 Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. III (I930).
9 Herbert, Rex v. Pratt and Merry, The Tax on Virtue, in Uncommon Law 397 (1936).
lo United States Trust Co. v. Com'r, 296 U.S. 481 (1936).
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Revenue Code in Supplement E, dealing with estates and trusts, still
follow the original theory of the income tax laws in treating each and
every family trust as potentially a separate taxpayer, against which in-
come tax is computed just as it is computed against an actual living per-
son, and with the same rates of progression. It is true that to the extent
that such a trust actually pays out or is required by its terms to pay out
current income to named beneficiaries, the sums thus paid out constitute
income to the beneficiary and are deductible from the taxable income of
the trust. However, accumulated income is income of the trust and is
not taxable to any beneficiary either at the time it accrues or, so long as
it is not paid out currently, at any other time. It is taxable to the trust
alone, at surtax rates determined by the net income of the trust and un-
affected by the income of present or future beneficiaries. Thus anyone
whose income is so largely in excess of his actual needs that he consistently
saves a large part of it (practically all really high-bracket taxpayers come
within this classification) can move his tax rates down theoretically as
far as he wants, and practically to a very substantial degree, by establish-
ing multiple trusts to accumulate income for his wife or descendants."
Of course, he has to do this correctly, and must be prepared to employ
and pay competent counsel to guard him against technical slips. He must
divorce himself from effective control. He would do well not to keep even
the possibility of enjoying the income again himself at any future date.
If he is really worried about eating regularly, he can, however, give the
trustee discretion to pay part of the income to his wife if she should ever
need it. If she is a fair-minded person, she would undoubtedly be willing,
by an unrelated transaction and in some other taxable year, to make
similar provision for her spouse. If we really wish to tax the rich at the
tremendously high rates now called for by the income tax laws, it seems
rather childish to permit this type of tax saving, subject as it is to tricky
and somewhat dubious limitations but uncontested in principle.
In 1937 the United States Senate conducted an investigation of the
tax-saving devices of the rich-"clever little schemes" which resulted in
the capricious application or non-application of top rates. Various curious
devices, such as the incorporated yacht or private estate, were in fact out-
- Ibid.
12 For a relatively recent judicial limitation on the trust device, consider Helvering v.
Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (194o). While this case creates doubt as to the precise location of the
line between trusts properly taxable as separate entities and trusts income from which should
be taxed to the grantor, it contains only the barest hint of doubt as to the effectiveness of the
trust device, correctly used.
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lawed by the loophole-closing tax law of 1937. In the discussions then
current and in the horrible examples paraded before the Senate investiga-
tory committee, a very prominent place was given to multiple family
trusts, yet the only attack on these trusts actually included in the
bill was a reduction of the basic exemption of such trusts from $i,ooo to
$ioo.13 Of course this didn't affect the actual tax saving to any material
extent. The tax saving results from the fact that one income of $ioo,ooo
a year is taxed at a maximum rate of 64 per cent and an average rate of
almost 50 per cent while five incomes of $2o,ooo a year are each taxed at
a maximum rate of 38 per cent and an average rate of less than 25 per
cent. The loophole-closing act did not affect and did not purport to affect
this saving. X4 An income tax law really designed to eliminate tax advan-
tages resulting from a formal separation of a single family income would
provide not merely, as did the unsuccessful draft House bill of 1941, that
husband and wife must file a joint return, but also that the income of the
entire family unit and any income being accumulated for either spouse or
for descendants be likewise included.
An even less drastic change would catch the bulk of the present tax
leakage. If anyone is particularly worried about the constitutionality of
treating family income as a unit, or by the problems of draftsmanship and
of administration which would be raised, a much simpler device could
largely accomplish the same purpose. This would be, without dis-
turbing the present general structure of the taxation of trusts, to apply
an extremely high tax rate to the undistributed income of the trust. No
one has ever advanced any reason for taxing trusts at the same rate as
individuals, and no serious constitutional question would be raised by
taxing them at different rates. If the undistributed income of private
trusts were taxed, let us say, at a basic rate of 8o per cent, the income of
such trusts would be forced out and distributed to the beneficiaries. In
a common type of trust, where the trustee has the option of distributing
income to the grantor's spouse or accumulating it for descendants, this
would crowd the income back again into a single fund where the higher
rates would apply. Coupled with a mandatory joint return, it would en-
'3 Consult Paul, The Background of the Revenue Act of 1937, 5 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 41
(1937); G. F. James, Jr., The Loophole-Closing Revenue Act of 1937, 23 A.B.A.J. 759 (1937)-
14 Ibid. A similarly narrow and ineffective change was made in 1938, when the exemption
from gift tax of $4,ooo given to any one individual in any one year was made inapplicable to
gifts in trust. Revenue Act of 1938, at § 5o5(a), 52 Stat. 55 (i938). Although apparently
intended to discourage the use of trusts to minimize income and estate taxes, the change was
too small to have any substantial effect.
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tirely eliminate tax savings where husband or wife was the immediate
beneficiary of distributed income. In other cases, of course, the trust
might be so drawn that distributed income would actually go to children,
where it would fall into lower surtax brackets than if it were paid to the
grantor or the grantor's spouse. In such cases, however, the tax saving
resulting from split incomes would be available only in the situation where
the income actually was split and went immediately and irrevocably to
some person other than the grantor or the grantor's spouse who was pres-
ently identified and able to receive it. While this solution would on the
whole be less satisfactory than that of taxing the entire family as a single
unit, it would go a long way toward accomplishing the supposed purposes
of the 1937 law. Indeed, the suggestion is so simple and obvious that it
is difficult to see why it was not adopted at that time if we are to assume
that a serious effort was then made to equalize the impact of income taxes
upon persons similarly situated and to obtain effective enforcement of the
cumulative rates which the law purports to levy.
The discussion this far has been based upon one major assumption,
more or less clearly expressed. This assumption is that the income tax
law should be, to use the phrase of Professor Henry Simons, "a levy upon
individuals according to their respective income circumstances,"1s and that
it accomplishes its basic purpose only to the extent that it does tax indi-
viduals in accordance with their ability to pay, with the minimum of dis-
crimination among tax payers similarly situated. Theoretically, we may
assume that few persons would dissent from this statement of the objec-
tives and practical test of the federal income tax. It is necessary to restate
it, however, as a preface for discussion of that most curious anomaly
under the Sixteenth Amendment, the corporate income tax.
From the very earliest days of the federal income tax, corporations have
been treated as taxpayers distinct from their individual stockholders, the
corporate entity being most meticulously respected. For the decade from
1918 to 1928, corporations paid a tax on their net incomes at non-progres-
sive rates ranging from 12 to 13 per cent. 6 During the same period indi-
vidual tax rates at top surtax brackets ranged from 25 to 69 per cent."7
X5 Simons, Personal Income Taxation 2o3 (1938).
16 Revenue Act of ig8, at § 230(a)(I), 40 Stat. 1075 (1919); Revenue Act of X921, at §230
(b), 42 Stat. 252 (1921); Revenue Act of 1924, at § 230, 43 Stat. 282 (1924); Revenue Act of
X926, at § 23o(a)(x), 44 Stat. 39 (1926); Revenue Act of 1928, at § 13(a), 45 Stat. 797 (1928).
17 Revenue Act of i918, at § 211(a), 40 Stat. 1o62 (i919); Revenue Act of 1921, at § 211(a)
(W), 42 Stat. 233 (1921); Revenue Act of 1924, at § 211(a), 43 Stat. 265 (1924); Revenue Act of
1926, at § 211(a), 44 Stat. 21 (1926); Revenue Act of 1928, at § 12(a), 4S Stat. 796 (1928).
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Money earned by a corporation would first be subject to the moderate
corporate tax. If the corporate earnings were then paid out in dividends,
each individual shareholder would pay surtax on his pro rata share at a
rate determined by his own income for that year. It was immediately ob-
vious that large investors would in many cases be far better off if their
corporations refrained from declaring dividends. The shareholder's net
worth would thus grow with his pro rata interest in the corporate surplus,
free from progressive surtaxes as long as he kept his original investment
unchanged. If the investor should realize his capital gain by selling a part
of his stock, the law has contained since 1921 various provisions limiting
the total tax he must pay. For a number of years the maximum rate on
capital gains was i21 per cent.'8 Today it is 15 per cent. 9 Moreover, if
the investor never sold his investment, so that it passed to his heirs or
legatees on his death, the capital gain forever escaped taxation. This has
been the law from the first (expressly so since 1921) and still is. ° .
This state of the law offered a wide-open door for the reduction of effec-
tive surtax rates on large investors by the interposition of corporations to
hold and accumulate income. To meet this defect the acts of 1916 and
1918 provided that the income of any corporation "formed or availed of
for the purpose of preventing the imposition of the surtax upon its stock-
holders" should be treated as the income of its shareholders and taxed to
them.2 ' In i92 this particular device was abandoned (apparently be-
cause of constitutional doubts) and instead a special tax of 5o per cent
was levied upon the net income of corporations "formed or availed of for
the purpose of preventing the imposition of the surtax upon its stock-
holders. ' '2 This penal tax, still to be found with a reduced rate in Section
102 of the Internal Revenue Code, may have discouraged the flagrant use
of corporations to avoid surtax through the accumulation of income, but
it has never been very widely or effectively enforced. Its test of purpose,
even supported by various presumptions, robs it of much of its effect. A
second abortive attempt to force corporate earnings out into the hands
of shareholders where they will be subject to surtax was made in the un-
is Revenue Act of i92i, at § o6(b), 42 Stat. 232 (1921); Revenue Act of 1924, at § 2o8(b),
43 Stat. 262 (1924); Revenue Act of 1926, at § 2o8(b), 44 Stat. 19 (1926); Revenue Act of 1928,
at § ioi(a), 45 Stat. 81i (1928).
19 Int. Rev. Code § 117(b) and (c)(I), 53 Stat. 5I (1939).
20 int. Rev. Code § 113(a) (5), 53 Stat. 41 (r939).
2 Revenue Act of 1916, at § 3, 39 Stat. 758 (i916); Revenue Act of 1918, at § 220, 40 Stat.
1072 (1919).
- Revenue Act of 1921, at § 220, 42 Stat. 247 (1921).
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distributed earnings tax of 1936.23 The violent manner in which this de-
vice affected the internal management and financing of business, and its
highly oppressive operation in certain situations, led to its repeal. Then
the more obvious abuses were checked, or perhaps only forced to change
form, by the personal holding company tax of 1937, still in the law as
Chapter 2, Subchapter A of the code. Still, only the fringes of the prob-
lem have been touched.
In the meantime, there has been a dramatic change in corporate income
tax rates. From i918 to 1928 they varied from io to 13 per cent.2 4 In 1941
the normal tax on corporations varies from I5 to 24 per cent.25 On top
of the normal tax is mounted a trivial corporate surtax, 2 the capital
stock tax,2 7 the declared value excess profits tax,28 and a wartime excess
profits tax ranging from 35 to 6o per cent.2 9 Accurate estimates are
not available, but it is certainly safe to suppose that most good-sized
corporations will pay close to a half of their net incomes in federal in-
come and excess profits taxes. In the case of many corporations hav-
ing a fluctuating income and a relatively small invested capital, the
federal income tax may come very close to swallowing all the profits
which the stockholders might expect to receive. A small levy, justifiable
as a tax on the privilege of doing business with corporate advantages, has
become an important part of the income tax structure, in many cases the
major imposition against corporate earnings, dwarfing in importance the
eventual tax on corporate dividends (if any) in the hands of the share-
holders.
Viewed as a tax on individuals in proportion to their ability to pay,
this is most extraordinary. Unless one indulges in the fiction of consider-
23 Revenue Act of 1936, at § I4, 49 Stat. i655 (1936).
24 Revenue Act of igi8, at § 230(a)(i), 40 Stat. 1075 (i919); Revenue Act of I921, at § 230
(a), 42 Stat. 252 (1921); Revenue Act of 1926, at § 230(a)(i), 44 Stat. 39 (1926); Revenue Act
of 1928, at § 13(a), 45 Stat. 797 (X928).
2S Int. Rev. Code § 13, 53 Stat. 7 (I939), 26 U.S. C.A. § i3 (i94o), amended by 54 Stat.
517 (194o), 26 U.S.C.A. § 13 (Supp. 194o) and by H.R. 5417, 77tli Cong. ist Sess. § io3 (Pub.
L. No. 250, Sept. 20, 1941).
26 H.R. 5417, 77th Cong. 1st Sess. § 204 (Pub. L. No. 250, Sept. 20, 1941).
27nt. Rev. Code § 2200, 53 Stat. x69 (1939), 26 U.S.C.A. § 2200 (294o), amended by 54
Stat. 522 (2940), 26 U.S.C.A. § 2200 (Supp. i94o), and by H.R. 5427, 77th Cong. ist Sess.
§ 302 (Pub. L. No. 250, Sept. 20, 2941).
28 Int. Rev. Code § 6oo, 53 Stat. iii (I939), 26 U.S.C.A. § 6oo (294o), amended by 54 Stat.
522 (2940), 26 U.S.C.A. § 6oo (Supp. 294o), and by H.R. 5417, 7 7 th Cong. ist Sess. § 302
(Pub. L. No. 250, Sept. 20, 1941).
29 Int. Rev. Code § 72, 54 Stat. 975 (2940), 26 U.S.C.A. § 710 (Cum. Pamphlet 1941),
amended by H.R. 5417, 7 7 th Cong. ist Sess. § 201 (Pub. L. No. 250, Sept. 20, 1941).
HeinOnline  -- 9 U. Chi. L. Rev. 66 1941-1942
IRASCIBLE COMMENTS ON THE REVENUE LAWS
ing General Motors as a retired army man with a simply tremendous in-
come, he cannot help but observe that John Jones, a holder of ten shares
of stock in that great corporation, is paying his share of the corporate in-
come tax at the same rate as is Mr. Pierre DuPont. Thus the corporate
income tax operates to defeat the basic principle of the personal income
tax according to which each individual citizen contributes to the support
of the government in accordance with his own capacity to pay.
This thoroughly anomalous result can be justified only by urging that
the corporation must be taxed, if corporate accumulated or undistributed
income is to be taxed at all, since the stockholder pays only upon that
which he receives as dividends. Viewed in this light, the corporate in-
come tax generally serves the same purpose as the present Section 102
tax on improper accumulation of surplus, the tax on personal hold-
ing companies, and the former tax on undistributed corporate income.
This justification for corporate income taxes convinces only on the as-
sumption that the result must be obtained in this manner and cannot be
obtained in some other way, a way consistent with the basic notion of
progressive equality. Surely the obvious suggestion would be to tax the
stockholders of a corporation each on his proportionate part of the annual
income of the corporation, whether or not that income be distributed in
dividends. Such a tax, if it could be upheld against constitutional attack
and successfully administered, would have many advantages over the
present system. In the first place, it would eliminate the entire problem
of the accumulation of corporate surpluses to avoid surtax on the indi-
vidual stockholders. The always unsatisfactory Section 102 and the high-
ly controversial tax on undistributed earnings would be simply unneces-
sary. Corporate officers could plan expansion or retrenchment, reinvest-
ment or distribution, on the basis of the economic requirements of the
business, unaffected by the extraneous fiscal policies of the United States
or their own efforts to circumvent these policies. By permitting the stock-
holder to add undistributed corporate earnings, on which he must pay
tax, to the basis attributable to his stock on a future conversion of the
capital asset itself, the inherent difficulties surrounding the taxation of
capital gains would be very considerably minimized, a point to which fur-
ther reference will be made. Most important, the basic principle of ability
to pay as a criterion in the application of the tax laws, would be served.
If the change resulted in reducing revenue (and it is by no means certain
that it would), this problem could be directly attacked by changes in the
rates of individual tax.
There are two possible objections to this proposal. The first is a con-
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stitutional objection based on Eisner v. Macomber3o and the subsequent
cases which have rung the changes on the theory of corporate personality.
It would require undue digression here to work out in detail the constitu-
tional arguments on each side. They will be sufficiently obvious to any
student of this field. We do not hesitate to assert that few competent au-
thorities could honestly believe, in view of the present personnel of the
United States Supreme Court and the trend of modern decisions, that an
act taxing corporate stockholders pro rata on the undistributed profits of
the corporation would be held invalid as an income tax under the Six-
teenth Amendment. The court today should be ready to accept the practi-
cal wisdom of Mr. justice Holmes' dissent in Eisner v. Macomber. "The
known purpose of this Amendment was to get rid of nice questions as to
what might be direct taxes, and I cannot doubt that most people not
lawyers would suppose when they voted for it that they put a question
like the present to rest."'3 Once they understood the issues, it can hardly
be doubted that most persons not lawyers would regard the suggested
tax on corporate shareholders as falling much more fairly within the pur-
poses of the Sixteenth Amendment than does the present corporate in-
come tax.
The other possible objection to taxing corporate shareholders on the
undistributed profits of the corporation is the one advanced by Professor
Simons, "that it would involve serious administrative difficulties ..... ,,32
The problem about which Professor Simons was primarily concerned was
the difficulty of allocating undistributed earnings among different classes
of owners in view of the many types of preferred and semi-preferred, com-
mon and semi-common stocks, which may be issued under the varying
corporation laws of our forty-eight states. While no one would deny that
in many cases allocation might present serious problems, they should not
prove insuperable. The obvious rule of thumb would be to allocate each
year's earnings to those security holders to whom they would be payable
if the directors of the corporation had elected to pay out that entire
year's earnings in dividends. Normally this would require payment first
against current interest and accumulated interest, if any, then against
arrearages on cumulative preferred stocks, if any, and to current preferred
dividends, and finally to common or other fully participating stocks. Pro-
fessor Simons has pointed out that any substantial increase in corporate
earnings will be reflected marketwise in an increase in the value of all se-
30 252 U.S. I89 (1920).
3' Ibid., at 220.
32 Simons, Personal Income Taxation 19o (1938).
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curities currently selling below par, even though arrearages may be such
that no part of current earnings could be distributed to junior claims.
But this is hardly the point. If a common stock increases on the market
because prior claims have been reduced, some owners will sell and others
will not. Those who sell will be taxed to the extent that they realize a
capital gain. As for those who do not sell, it is hard to see why they should
be taxed on such a highly speculative paper profit until either they do
realize it by a sale or the corporation reaches the stage of having free earn-
ings distributable, whether or not actually distributed, to their stock
holdings. 33
Undoubtedly there would be some cases of corporate structures so com-
plicated or securities so ambiguous and unusual that real difficulties of
allocation would be encountered. In such cases the Treasury Department
might very properly exercise pressure, through its regulations, toward
simplification and standardization, as it has done to a considerable extent
in corporate accounting. It is worth noting that the present pressure of
the corporate income tax is toward increased fixed debt and away from
equity financing, because interest paid is deductible in computing taxable
corporate net income, while dividends paid are not. This incidental effect
of the present law is highly important at the present corporate tax rates
and, to say the least, doubtful as an item of public policy.
Finally, while it need not be supposed that treasury regulations and ad-
ministrative determinations could achieve perfect justice in the applica-
tion of an undistributed profits tax to all classes of corporate shareholders
with their diversity, it is not clear why such an ideal standard should be
set. The present system of taxing the corporation itself on its income has
no merit other than an apparent simplicity. It does not achieve even
substantial justice among shareholders because it doesn't attempt to.
Any system not utterly unworkable, which taxed the shareholders upon
the corporate earnings, would be an improvement on the present law.
Moreover, as suggested before, the taxation of undistributed corporate
income to the shareholders would minimize the extremely difficult prob-
lem of capital gains taxation. This problem is an aspect, and ordinarily
the most severe aspect, of the larger problem of fluctuating income and
the annual determination of tax. Despite out general aim at uniformity,
two men otherwise similarly situated, each of whom earned $ioo,ooo over
33 Whenever shares of stock were sold, an apparent difficulty would arise in apportioning
the tax between buyer and seller in the year in which the sale took place. The convenient
method would be to tax annual undistributed earnings to stockholders on the last day of the
year. The market should operate to adjust the tax burden fairly between buyer and seller.
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a ten-year period, would be taxed very differently if one of them earned
his at a uniform rate of $o,ooo a year and the other earned $3,o00 in an
average year and $73,000 in one extraordinarily good year. While this
result might follow from an extraordinary legal fee or a group of tremen-
dous commissions, it would most commonly follow from the sale of capital
assets, the value of which had appreciated over a period of years and was
realized in the year of sale. It is at least in part to minimize such unfair-
ness that the law has always treated capital gains differently from ordi-
nary income, applying to them a maximum tax rate very substantially
less than that applicable to ordinary income in the top surtax brackets.
On the other hand, this generous treatment of capital gains has in turn
compelled the adoption of largely ineffective measures to prevent the ac-
cumulation of corporate income, to avoid surtax on stockholders.
The suggestion that capital gains be taxed precisely like any other in-
come would prevent the use of the present capital gains provision to mini-
mize taxation. However, we should be caught on the other horn of the
dilemma; the law would operate unfairly against the taxpayer who in any
taxable year was forced to liquidate large blocks of securities which had
greatly appreciated in value over a long period of time. If we should go
further, in line with Professor Simons' suggestion,34 and treat any dis-
position of capital assets whether by sale, by gift, or by the death of the
owner as an occasion for realization, this unfairness would be aggravated.
However, 85 per cent of all the capital gains which are reported and go
into taxable income are derived from the sale of securities,3s and very
largely from the sale of equity securities rather than bonds. If all holders
of stock were required to pay tax on their pro rata share of corporate in-
come as it accrues to the corporation, and were permitted to add undis-
tributed corporate income on which they had been taxed to their basis for
gain or loss on subsequent disposition of the security, the heart would be
cut out of the capital gains problem. It would then be generally satis-
factory to tax such gain as ordinary income in the year of its realization,
treating any transfer, whether by sale, exchange, gift, devise, or inheri-
tance, as a realization by the transferor for this purpose and using fair
market value at the date of transfer as the measure of realization where
nothing of monetary value is received in exchange. This treatment of
transfers by gift, will or descent as resulting in realization of gain by the
transferor, as advocated by Simons, would plug a huge hole in the present
law, by which unrealized gain in assets passing on death forever escapes
the income tax.
34 Simons, Personal Income Taxation c. vii (1938). 3s Ibid., at 137 n. 4.
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There would still be some cases in which income would be grossly dis-
torted by the sale in one year of assets which had appreciated over a con-
siderable period of time. This might be particularly true of real estate
and of businesses which had expanded greatly in gross operations without
yielding any net income in their earlier years. In order to protect such
taxpayers, the law should provide for the periodic appraisal of investment
assets and the reporting of gain (but not loss) thereon for income tax pur-
poses, at the option of the taxpayer. While this would permit the tax-
payer to level out his income in such a way as to produce the minimum
tax, such a power can hardly be criticized. On the other hand there'
should be little reason for sympathizing with someone who, having the
right to pay a tax periodically on the unrealized value of his estate, failed
to exercise this right in his lifetime, thereby subjecting his estate to heavy
income taxation.
The question of the income taxation, in the estate of a decedent, of the
previously unrealized value of his assets, leads naturally to the related
question of gift, inheritance, and estate taxation. One peculiarity of es-
tate tax laws, such as the federal act, is that they, unlike inheritance
taxes, are calculated on the wealth, and hence presumable ability to pay,
not of the heir but of the decedent. In any practical sense and regardless
of form, the tax is obviously on the man who succeeds to the property,
not on the man whose enjoyment is permanently terminated by his own
death. It is therefore a little difficult to see why a single system of taxa-
tion under the Internal Revenue Code should contain the income tax,
based at least in theory on the ability to pay of the actual taxpayer, and
the estate tax, based upon the ability to pay of the actual taxpayer's
predecessor in interest. A serious attempt to redesign our federal tax
structure into a coherent and understandable whole based upon an
avowed philosophy should include a change back from the estate to the
inheritance tax system.
However, this change has many times been advocated and on occasion
seriously urged in Congress, but has not been accepted. Assuming a con-
tinuance of the present estate tax, supplemented by a gift tax, there are
rather evident anomalies in the present structure. The oddest of these is
the complete separation of the gift and estate taxes. Every owner of
property may give away $4o,ooo worth (plus considerably more) in his
lifetime without paying any tax upon it,36 and then start paying his tax
at a rate of 21 per cent on the first $5,ooo in excess of all exemptions. This
36 Int. Rev. Code § ioo4(a)(i), 53 Stat. 147 (1939), 26 U.S.C.A. § 1004(a)(i) (i94o).
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can be run up to $250,000 with a maximum rate of less than 25 per cent. 37
Then at the death of this property holder a second $4o,ooo exemption is
applicable to his estate,35 and after this the rate runs from 3 per cent
on the first $5,ooo to a maximum rate of 30 per cent on $250,000.39 The
rate of tax paid on the decedent's estate is in no wise affected by the
amount of property which he may have given away in his lifetime. In
other words, the gift and estate taxes have cumulative rates but the latter
does not cumulate upon the former. Hence, if two persons each had a
million dollars and one of them gave away about 6o per cent of it in his
lifetime and let the balance pass in his estate at his death to the same
donees, and the other let the entire million dollars pass at his death, the
total tax paid in the two cases would be very different. Roughly, the
man who gave away $6oo,ooo in his lifetime would pay a little over
$225,000 in gift and estate taxes together, while the man who let the
entire million pass at his death would pay around $3io,ooo. There is pre-
sumably no strong public policy in fhvor of wealthy persons getting rid
of their property during their lifetime and transferring it into the hands
of their putative heirs. The great discrepancy in tax in these two situa-
tions results not from an attempt to obtain any desired governmental
end but merely echoes the history of the adoption of the two taxes. Its
practical effect is greatly to reduce the apparently high brackets applica-
ble to some but not all persons of great wealth, the favored group being
those who obtain timely and reliable legal advice and are willing to act
upon it. Since the gift tax already provides the structure for cumulative
rates by which the rate applicable to gifts in later years is determined in
part by the amount previously given,4O it would be administratively a
simple enough matter to extend the same principle to the estate tax as
well, materially increasing the revenue and eliminating another arbitrary
inequality in the operation of the law. 4' Incidentally, it may be added
37 Int. Rev. Code § IooI(a)(2), 53 Stat. 144 (1939), 26 U.S.C.A. § boox(a)(2) (1940),
amended by 54 Stat. 521, 26 U.S.C.A. § iooi (Supp. i94o), and by H.R. 5417, 77th Cong. ist
Sess. § 402 (Pub. L. No. 250, Sept. 20, i94i).
38 Int. Rev. Code § 935(c), 53 Stat. 141 (1939), 26 U.S.C.A. § 935(c) (1940).
39 Int. Rev. Code § 935(b), 53 Stat. 141 (1939), 26 U.S.C.A. § 9 35(b) (194o), amended by
H.R. 5417, 77th Cong. ist Sess. § 4ox (Pub. L. No. 250, Sept. 20, 1941).
4Int. Rev. Code § iooi(a)(i), 53 Stat. 144 (1939), 26 U.S.C.A. § ioox(a)(i) (i94o).
41 Since this manuscript was prepared, William C. Warren has considered the whole prob-
lem of correlation of gift and estate taxes. Warren, Correlation of Gift and Estate Taxes,
55 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1941). In his conclusion, after mentioning the possibility of integrating
the two taxes with a single cumulative rate structure, he suggests an analysis by which all
transfers of capital which leave the taxable income in the grantor are subject to estate (but not
gift) taxes, and all "transfers which take the taxable income out of the grantor are subject to
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that the $4oooo exemption now contained in the estate tax law in favor
of insurance payable to beneficiaries other than the estate of the decedent42
appears to have no justification whatsoever. While undoubtedly life in-
surance is a good thing for many purposes and in many situations and
should be encouraged, it seems ridiculous to encourage it by a tax reduc-
tion which has no operation at all in case of estates of $4oooo or less and
is not significant in amount except in substantially larger estates. The
widowed and orphaned beneficiaries of estates in the large tax brackets
are not the persons whose need for the proceeds of life insurance can be a
major concern of public policy. The special exemption of life insurance
proceeds was probably a compromise adopted when the estate tax law
was first extended specifically to cover insurance proceeds paid to named
beneficiaries other than the estate of the decedent. Operating as it does
to produce a variation in tax unrelated to the financial status of the tax-
payer, it tends, although not to a major extent, to distort the equitable
operation of the system and should be eliminated.
The biggest hole in our present tax system not yet discussed is the in-
come tax exemption in favor of interest paid on the securities of state and
local governmental units. So much has been written on this subject that
it should be unnecessary to pursue it further. 43 It is unsound in law, vi-
ciously unsound in economics, and has been supported in recent years only
by the advocates of special interests which would be, or fear that they
might be, injured by its abolition. The Attorney General reported years
ago in a well-documented opinion that the Constitution of the United
States does not require its continuance. 44 Its presence in the law today
can be explained only by the lethargy or political timidity of our public
officials.
Much that has been said in this paper is so nearly self-evident as to be
almost trite. Certain suggestions on the other hand may have some merit
of novelty and on examination may commend themselves. Still other
portions, such as the discussion of taxing corporate profits, raise much
gift (but not estate) taxes. Apparently a single cumulative rate structure is not contemplated.
It is hard to see why this suggestion, preserving the inequality resulting from the double rate
standard, should be said to be "unlike integration, not based on expediency but on the funda-
mental legal principles underlying the three federal taxes and on a sense of innate fairness."
42 Int. Rev. Code § 8iI(g), 53 Stat. 120 (1939), 26 U.S.C.A. § 8ii(g) (r94o).
43 Consult Simons, Personal Income Taxation c. vii (1938). The literature is collected in
Mertens, The Law of Federal Income Taxation § 6.69 (Cum. Supp. 1939).
44 Taxation of Government Bondholders and Employees: The Immunity Rule and the
Sixteenth Amendment (U.S. Dept. of Justice 1938).
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more basic and serious problems, and strong objections may be urged to
them. But no one can hope to devise a perfect system of taxation in the
compass of a short article or from the ivory tower of the academic. This
paper will have achieved its purpose if it satisfies the reader that there are
many basic changes in the law which might be made, that certain of these
are rather obviously sound, and that others are constitutionally possible
and have much to recommend them. In the meantime the Treasury De-
partment and the Congress go on tinkering with the minor details of a
basically faulty system. Is it not time for the appointment of a commis-
sion to consider the complete reconstruction of our internal revenue code,
with an ideal system in mind and without undue concern for political
sacred cows or for the apparent but illusory inevitability which arises
from familiarity over a score of years with the present structure of the
law? If a code so designed were never put into effect, it could still afford
the blueprints of a better system and, simply by stirring dissatisfaction,
lead to greater reforms than the history of the last few years permits us
to expect.
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